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THE NEW FEDERAL RULES AND PROCEDURAL
REFORM IN INDIANA
By BERNARD C. GAVIT#

I
Indiana has a disturbing history and a poor reputation in
the field of procedure.1 The Code of Procedure which was
originally adopted in 1852 and re-enacted in 1881 was a layman's reform placed on the statute books over the objection
of a substantial majority of the lawyers and judges of the
state. It was placed there in compliance with the mandate of
Section 20 of Article 7 of the Constitution of 1851. That
section required the next General Assembly to provide for a
commission "whose duty it should be to revise, simplify and
abridge the rules, practice, pleadings and forms of the Courts
of Justice. And they shall provide for abolishing the distinct
forms of action at law, now in use; and that justice shall be
administered in a uniform system of pleading, without distinction between law and equity." That section of the Constitution was opposed by the lawyer members of the Constitutional Convention almost without exception. They refused
to believe that there was anything wrong with the common
law and equity procedure as it had been developed in England
during the Middle Ages.2 Despite this opposition the public
inaugurated a reform which resulted in the adoption by the
General Assembly in 1852 of the new Field Code of Procedure from New York.
The Code which was thus written into the statute law of
Indiana received, on the whole, a cold welcome from the
bench and bar. Indeed it is not an exaggeration to say that
* Dean of Indiana University School of Law.
1 The casebooks on procedure contain a generous sprinkling of Indiana
cases. Most of them are included to illustrate a distinctive minority or
"erroneous" view on the point involved.
2 No small amount of time in the Constitutional Convention was devoted
to a discussion of this section. Practically all of the opposition came from the
lawyer members.
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there was something resembling a premeditated rebellion
against it. It was treated as an unwelcome relative who had
long overstayed his uninvited and boresome visit. It became
the step-child of the law. The result has been that we have
inherited from the lawyers and judges of the second half of
the nineteenth century some very poor case law and an unsympathetic attitude toward the reforms obviously intended
by the Codes of 1852 and 1881. 3
Consider as Exhibit No. 1 the case of The City of Logansport v. Kihm4 decided by the Indiana Supreme Court in 1902.
In this case the complaint was for personal injuries in which
the plaintiff alleged that a certain street in the City of Logansport, paved with brick, was negligently suffered by the city
to get out of repair and to become worn and sunken at a certain point so that a hole formed four inches in depth, two feet
in width, and three feet long, three sides of the hole sloping
outward and the east end thereof being nearly perpendicular.
The plaintiff also alleged "that while she (the plaintiff) was
riding her bicycle upon said street she approached the said
street, so out of repair as aforesaid, from the west
end,
.
. and having no knowledge of the defect in
said street .
.
struck said defective, unsafe and out-ofrepair street, and by reason of said street being out of repair
she was thrown violently from her bicycle" etc. to her injury.
A demurrer for insufficient facts was overruled, there
was a trial, a verdict and a judgment for the plaintiff and
an appeal by the defendant. The Supreme Court reversed
the judgment with instruction to sustain the demurrer, holding
that the complaint was insufficient, for the reason that it did
not allege cause in fact, saying that the allegation to the
effect that the plaintiff's bicycle sruck the defective street
was not an allegation that it had struck the defect in the
street; therefore there was no connection alleged between
the alleged negligence and the injury.
-

3The Code of 1852 was re-enacted in 1881 without substantial change. It
was part of a proposed general revision of the statute law of the state which
never materialized.
4 The City of Logansport v. Kihm, (1902) 159 Ind. 68, 64 N. E. 595.
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The case is extreme, but not unusual. The decision ignored
and violated the following provisions in the Code of Procedure: (Burns' Ind. Stat. Ann. 1933.)
2-1048 (403). Liberal construction-Indefiniteness,how corrected.
In the construction of a pleading, for the purpose of determining its
effect, its allegations shall be liberally construed with a view to substantial justice between the parties; but when the allegations of a
pleading are so indefinite or uncertain that the precise nature of the
charge or defense is not apparent, the court may require the pleading to
be made definite and certain by amendment. (Acts 1881 (Spec. Sess.),
ch. 38, Sec. 126, p. 240.)
2-1013 (368). Demurrer overruled-Judgment. The judgment
upon overruling a demurrer shall be that the party shall plead over;
and the answer or reply shall not be deemed to overrule the objection
taken by demurrer. But no objection taken by demurrer, and overruled, shall be sufficient to reverse the judgment, if it appears from the
whole record that the merits of the cause have been fairly determined.
If a party fails to plead after the demurrer is overruled, judgment
shall be rendered against him as upon a default. (Acts 1881 (Spec.
Sess.), ch. 38, Sec. 91, p. 240.)
2-1063 (418). Variance, when immaterial-Procedurewhen party
misled. No variance between the allegations in a pleading and the
proof is to be deemed material, unless it has actually misled the adverse
party, to his prejudice, in maintaining his action or defense upon the
merits. Whenever it is alleged that a party has been so misled, that
fact must be proved to the satisfaction of the court, and it must be
shown in what respect he has been misled; and, thereupon, the court
may order the pleading to be amended on such terms as may be just.
(Acts 1881 (Spec. Sess.), ch. 38, Sec. 130, p. 240.)
3-1071 (426). Judgment not reversed for technical errors in the
pleadings or proceedings. The court must, in every stage of the action,
disregard any error or defect in the pleadings or proceedings which
does not affect the substantial rights of the adverse party; and no
judgment can be reversed or affected by reason of such error or defect.

(Acts 1881 (Spec. Sess.), ch. 38, Sec. 137, p. 240.)
2-3231 (725).

Defect in form no ground for reversal. No judg-

ment shall be stayed or reversed, in whole or in part, by the Supreme
Court, for any defect in form, variance or imperfection contained in
the record, pleadings, process, entries, returns, or other proceedings
therein, which, by law, might be amended by the court below; but such
defects shall be deemed to be amended in the Supreme Court; nor shall
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any judgment be stayed or reversed, in whole or in part, where it shall
appear to the court that the merits of the cause have been fairly tried
and determined in the court below. (Acts 1881 (Spec. Sess.), ch. 38,
Sec. 659, p. 240.)

Down to about 1913 one will look in vain in the decisions
of the Appellate courts of Indiana for any consistent mention
or serious discussion of those statutes.5 Since that time there
have been some instances where they have been given effect;
but the results are highly inconsistent, even down to the present date. For example, in 12 N. E. (2d) 348, 350 will be
found two cases both decided by the Supreme Court of Indiana on January 25, 1938.0 In the first case the court held
that in an action on a promissory note where illegality had
not been pleaded as a defense evidence of illegality should
be disregarded. In the second case the court held that a
complaint alleging an oral contract sustained a judgment
where the plaintiff proved a written contract saying "with
the adequacy of the complaint we are not concerned, since
on appeal, it may be treated as amended to conform to the
facts."
Similar instances can be multiplied. Again, for example,
in one recent case the Appellate Court of Indiana sustained
an affirmative equitable judgment for a plaintiff on the theory
that he had proved an equitable cause of action although his
complaint was clearly based on another "theory." 7 On the
other hand, case after case is reported where the court
re-iterates the time-worn phrase that recovery may only be
had on the "theory of the pleadings."

s

5 In 1913 the case of Domestic Block Coal Co. v. De Armey, (1913) 179
Ind. 592, 102 N. E. 99, was decided. The court refused to follow many of the
older cases and gave full effect to the statutes set out above. The case constitutes a distinct turning point toward a more liberal view on the subject.
6 McCarthy v. Miller, (1938) 213 Ind. 596, 12 N. E. (2d) 348; Western &
Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Vale, (1938) 213 Ind. 601, 12 N. E. (2d) 350.
7 Hosanna v. Odishoo, (1933) 187 N. E. 897. This case was transferred to
the Supreme Court, where the same result was reached for different reasons.
208 Ind. 132 (1935).
8 See, Dickerson v. Ewin, (1938) 105 Ind. App. 694, 17 N. E. (2d) 496. See
also notes, 6 Ind. L. J. 402, 575; 11-482.
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II

The attitude of the courts reflects the attitude of the bar,
and I intend no specific or individual criticism of either. The
results do indicate, I think, an unhealthy situation. Rebellion
against democratic legislative and constitutional authority can
hardly be condoned (and in any event the rules of the Code
have now become judicial, for on June 21, 1937, the Supreme
Court adopted them in toto as rules of court). An insistence
on the doctrines of common law procedure at this late date
is intellectually and politically unsound and is unprofessional.
We will be very wise to accept the philosophy of the Code
which went to some length to repudiate the common law
doctrine which required that a perfect compliance with the
rules of procedure was a pre-requisite to a favorable decision
on the merits. In no uncertain terms the Code in Indiana
insists that procedure must be subordinated to substantive
rights. The Code being constitutionally valid we have no
legal right to refuse to accept it. We will be very wise also
to accept the facts of experience which demonstrate that the
common law dogma to the effect that he issues in a case can
properly and with justice to the parties be determined by
written pleadings, under penalty of excommunication, is a
mistaken hope. The meritorious basis for the Code provision
repudiating the common law on this subject is therefore apparent. We will be very wise, also, if we deal rather harshly
with those members of the bar who insist upon procedure for
delay or unfair advantage.
Every recent development in the field of procedure sustains
those propositions. The statutes cited-the increasingly liberal provisions for the amendments of pleadings-express or
implied-indicate a common acceptance of a system of pleading which will remove from the field of procedure the last
traces of formalism. 9 Experience demonstrates that any
acceptance of those developments necessarily destroys the
validity of written pleadings, except as a point of departure.
If written pleadings are subject to amendment or abandonment
9 The

new F R C P accept the Code provisions on this score.
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almost without limitation they become as unstable as a South
American government-as unreliable as a third-rate politician.
Wise lawyers rely not upon the pleadings but upon the conditional examination of the adverse party or an exhaustive
investigation in determining the real issues and probable evidence in any but a clear-cut case.
It occurs to me that those who would still cling to the contrary Common Law dogmas are in danger of being buried
in a dead past-and in turn they endanger the good of the
order. One who defends such a position because of the
veneration due the Common Law must also by the same sign
defend all other Common Law doctrines, for they are all
equally venerable. He must operate on the assumption that
fraud is immaterial in contract liability; that one is liable in
trespass for inevitable accident; that a defendant in a criminal
case may not testify, and innumerable other rules which a
more recent social judgment has repudiated.
It has been reported that some lawyers have objected to
any revision of our rules of procedure along the lines suggested by the Judicial Council as undesirable because it would
take the "fun and sport" out of the trial of cases. I don't
know how serious those assertions are-but I think I do know
that such an attitude is not entirely non-existent-and that
under the law it is clearly unprofessional, and constitutes
contempt of court and forms a proper basis for disciplinary
action.
The Indiana Statutes on the subject follow: (Burns' Indiana Statutes Annotated 1933.)
4-3608 (1038). Duties of attorney. It shall be the duty of an
attorney.
First. To support the constitution and laws of the United States
and of this state.
Second. To maintain the respect that is due to the courts of justice
and judicial officers.
Third. To counsel or maintain such actions, proceedings or defenses
only as appear to him legal and just; but this section shall not be
construed to prevent the defense of a person charged with crime, in
any case.
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Fourth. To employ for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means only as are consistent with truth, and never
seek to mislead the court or jury by any artifice or false statement of
fact or law. (Acts 1881 (Spec. Sess.), ch. 38, Sec. 836, p. 240; 1937,
ch. 88, Sec. 1, p. 452.)
4-3614 (1044). Revoking admission of attorney. Any circuit or
superior court of the county in which an attorney resides shall revoke
the admission of such attorney to practice law in the state of Indiana
in a proceeding brought in conformity with the provisions of the
statutes of Indiana, whenever:
Third. He has willfully violated any of the duties of an attorney, as
prescribed by statute; or
Fourth. He has willfully violated his oath as an attorney. (Acts
1881 (Spec. Sess.), ch. 38, Sec. 842, p. 240; ch. 38, Sec. 2, p. 452.)
Section 12-Article I of the Indiana Constitution provides
also: "Justice shall be administered . . . speedily without delay."
In the light of those rules dilatory tactics in the disposition
of litigation cannot be successfully defended. The common
argument to the effect that the adverse party's claim is unfounded, or even vexatious, and that therefore it may be
defeated justifiably by fair means or foul is clearly unsound.
The law provides methods of dealing with those mattersby contempt-discipline-injunction--liability for malicious
prosecution or abuse of process. It further prohibits one
being a judge in his own cause and contemplates the settlement of the claim by reasonably prompt judicial determination
of the controversy. There is a conclusive presumption that
judicial action will determine correctly the merits of the case,
and an attorney owes an affirmative obligation to the court
and the adverse party to so determine it, "speedily and without (unjustifiable) delay."

III
However, an effective and sound set of rules of procedure
takes cognizance of that situation, and is designed to expedite
the prompt decision of cases on their merits, and it pays some
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attention to adequate penalties for those who violate the letter
and spiirt of the rules on that subject. In those fields the new
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure constitute a vast improvement over the present Indiana procedure. For example, it
seems entirely fair to say that there is something radically
deficient in a system of procedure where it is possible for a
defendant to delay judgment on an admitted obligation for a
year or more by the simple fifing of inconsequential and immaterial pleadings. Many, many times a general denial is
filed in an action on a promissory note. It raises no real
issue, but the plaintiff has no recourse but to await the assignment of the case for trial, after which continuances may be
obtained, and a change of venue taken, although there is
nothing to try.
I would claim that it is a self-evident proposition that a
lawyer who accepts $25 for filing such an answer is in exactly
the same boat as a tax assessor who accepts $25 for the
approval of a fraudulent assessment. If the administration
of justice is public business, and a lawyer is an officer of the
state in that business, there is an equally clear violation of a
public trust in either case.
In contrast, Federal Rule 56 makes provision for summary
judgments. Under this rule either the plaintiff or the defendant, after an answer has been filed, may move for a summary
judgment and compel an immediate inquiry into the question
whether or not a genuine issue exists as to any material fact.
This procedure has been used successfully in New York and
other states for some time, and its adoption in this state would
make impossible, or at least unhealthy, the assertion of claims
and defense for their nuisance or dilatory value. Sub-section
(g) provides an adequate sanction:
"Should it appear to the satisfaction of the court at any time that
any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in

bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith
order the party employing them to pay to the other party the amount
of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused him
to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party
or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt."
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This latter provision is a specific application of Rule 11,
which applies to all pleadings:
"Every pleading of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed
by at least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose address
shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall
sign his pleading and state his address.

.

.

.

The signature of an

attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading;
that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good
ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay. If a
pleading is not signed or is signed with intent to defeat the purpose of
this rule, it may be stricken as sham and false and the action may
proceed as though the pleading had not been served. For a willful
violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary action. Similar action may be taken if scandalous or indecent
matter is inserted."
This does no more than state the Indiana law set out above.
There has never been any dissent in the authorities on the

proposition that an attorney who filed false or misleading
pleadings was guilty of misconduct. Certainly, however, an
emphatic restatement on the subject by the Supreme Court
would go a long way in encouraging observance. It is a safe
prediction that a trial court which took action once under a
rule similar to either Rule 11 or Rule 5 6 (g) would have only
occasional future difficulty on those subjects.
The Federal Rules prescribe definite times within which
pleadings and motions are to be filed. If a party has appeared
a default judgment may not be entered without three days
notice (Federal Rule 55 (b)), but it is unnecessary in the first
instance to get a rule to plead as under the Indiana practice
before a party is in default for failure to plead. The burden
is cast not upon the non-defaulting party but it is cast upon
the defaulting party to avoid the default. Under this procedure a great deal of the delay which is an incident to our
present practice during the pleading stage of the trial would
be eliminated.
Rule 12(g) prohibits the filing of successive motions to
separate, to make more specific, to strike out, and motions
to dismiss for insufficient facts. This is in keeping with Rule
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15 (a) which restricts the amendment of pleadings as a matter
of course to one amended pleading. Under the Federal Rules
a motion to dismiss for insufficient facts, a motion concerning
parties, and the other available motions must be specific, and
it therefore seems that the limitation as to one amended
pleading as a matter of course is not unfair. If a pleader
cannot write a good pleading after all of its defects have been
pointed out to him in detail he certainly in all good conscience
can be required to quit.
A great deal of energy and paper in addition can be saved
by the use of Rule 16:
"In an action, the court may in its discretion direct the attorneys
for the parties to appear before it for a conference to consider
(1) The simplifications of the issues;
(2) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the
pleadings;
(3) The possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of
documents which will avoid unnecessary proof;
(4) The limitation of the number of expert witnesses;
(5)
The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to
a master for findings to be used as evidence when the trial is to
be by jury;
(6) Such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the
action.
"The court shall make an order which recites the action taken at
the conference, the amendments allowed to the pleadings, and the agreements made by the parties as to any of the matters considered, and
which limits the issues for trial to those not disposed of by admissions
or agreements of counsel; and such order when entered controls the
subsequent course of the action, unless modified at the trial to prevent
manifest injustice. The court in its discretion may establish by rule
a pre-trial calendar on which actions may be placed for consideration
as above provided and may either confine the calendar to jury actions
or to non-jury actions or extend it to all actions."
This procedure has been used very effectively in other states,
and already in Judge Baltzell's court in this state. The judges
in Marion County recently adopted it on their own initiative,
and the Press has gone to great length in applauding the
move.
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Federal Rule 38 provides that a written demand for a jury
trial must be filed within ten days after the issue to be tried
by a jury is closed. In the absence of such a written demand
jury trial is waived. A proper demand may not be withdrawn
without the consent of the adverse party. The Rule is, of
course, designed primarily to eliminate the delay which very
frequently occurs under the Indiana practice where there is
no similar regulation. A party under the Indiana practice
may wait until the day a case is set for trial to raise the question of jury trial.
Federal Rule 41 (a) on the subject of voluntary dismissal
states a rule which is much fairer than the present Indiana
rule. Few, if any, states grant to the plaintiff the privilege of
voluntary dismissal without prejudice after a case has been
completely tried and the decision indicated as does the Indiana
rule. Under Federal Rule 41 the privilege of voluntary dismissal is limited to: (1) At a time before the service of an
answer, or (2) By agreement of all the parties. A second
voluntary dismissal of the same case, whether the first dismissal had been made in the same or another court, becomes
res judicata. Under this Rule a defendant could not be compelled to try the same case two or three times at the option
of the plaintiff, as he may under the present Indiana practice.
I am convinced that it is a fair commentary on those parts
of the Federal Rules that they constitute a great improvement
over our own practice. At least judges and lawyers who want
to get something done within a reasonable time will have a
procedure adequate to the task.
I believe it to be true that there is adequate provision in
the Federal Rules for the correction of honest mistakes which
a pleader is likely to make. On the other hand, there is likewise definitely imposed upon attorneys, judges and parties a
decent standard of professional competence and fair dealing,
which we cannot afford to deny as an essential element in the
administration of justice in this state. I hope the time has
come when the Bar of Indiana is willing to pay something
more than lip-service attention to the doctrine that a lawyer
is at once a scholar of the law, an advocate and yet also an
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officer of the state in the administration of justice. That, it
must be admitted, is a paradoxical position, but it simply
means that advocacy is to be kept within honest and fair
boundaries. An attorney may not do in the name of advocacy
what a client may not do under accepted standards of honesty
and fair dealing.
IV
So far as the general purport of the Federal Rules on
pleading are concerned they accept the basic philosophy of
the Code. A complaint or answer states the facts constituting
a claim or defense. But the inherent weakness of a complete
reliance on written pleadings as the sole and final method of
determining the issues in a case is recognized. Rule 15 makes
substantially the same provisions for amendment as do the
Indiana rules, and Rule 12 (h) does the same as to the waiver
of procedural defects. Rule 61 is almost the exact counterpart of our rules on the decision of cases on their merits.
The Federal Rules therefore contemplate that a party may
have to be somewhat content with a pleading which is rather
general in its terms, and which is subject to abandonment and
amendment before the case is disposed of finally. Detailed
provision is made for discovery, deposition and conditional
examination so that, as under the present Indiana practice,
a party who is really interested in pinning down an opponent
to the facts of his case has available an adequate procedure
under which he may accomplish that end.
The changes which the Federal Rules would make in the
details of procedure can be supported by persuasive reasons.
As a preliminary matter, I believe that it is wise, however,
to give recognition to the proposition that when the problem
involved is a choice of conflicting rules in the field of procedural technics the decision is bound to be somewhat, if not
wholly, arbitrary. One well established intelligible rule is as
valid as another. Thus I see little to argue about as between
a rule which places the burden as to contributory negligence
on the defendant and a rule which places it on the plaintiff so
far as any meritorious arguments are concerned. I think an
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attorney is likely to prefer one over the other depending on
whether he represents the plaintiff or the defendant. I have
a suspicion that the Indiana statute which places the burden
on the defendant in an action for personal injury was passed
because of the activities of lawyers interested in personal
injury cases for the plaintiff. Had there been a scientific
interest in the matter it is inconceivable that the rule in property damage cases would not have been likewise changed.
Again, for example, as between the Illinois rule that res
judicata is in issue only under a plea in abatement, and the
Federal Rule, making it an affirmative defense there is really
little to choose. Concededly there might be an advantage in
settling the question at the beginning, but this can be accom.
plished under the Federal Rules by the court ordering the issue
tried first. Again, whether the question of jurisdiction of the
subject-matter is to be raised by a demurrer, or a motion to
dismiss is entirely a matter of form.
Thus in many instances a new or different rule in this field
is most certainly as desirable as the traditional Indiana rule.
It must be remembered that the Federal Rules were subjected to the criticism of the Bar of the country. On a number
of points alternate rules were suggested, and the one finally
adopted received a substantial majority support. In the
interests of uniformity, as between the State and Federal
courts, and as between the States there is every reason why
we should give up a traditional preference for a rule which
at most is no better than the one proposed.
Nevertheless one can advance some meritorious arguments
for a great many of the proposed changes. Rule 8 (b) prohibiting a general denial unless made in good faith on reasonable grounds is a necessary corollary to the general attack on
procedure for delay, and is in keeping with the obviously valid
proposition that a decent system of pleading is properly
designed to eliminate the non-essential and undisputed facts
and to narrow the issues in a case to those which are real and
substantial.
Rule 8 (e) as to alternative allegations is a change in form
merely. One may reach the same result under the Indiana
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practice by a large amount of repetition in separate paragraphs of pleadings.
Rule 7(c) abolishing the demurrer, in the light of Rules
12 and 21, is not as radical as it might appear. Questions
formerly raised by demurrer or plea in abatement are raised
by an appropriate motion. A motion to quash, to dismiss
for lack of jurisdiction, for improper venue, improper service
of process, a motion to add or strike out parties, and finally
a motion to dismiss for insufficient facts, are substituted for
them.
Rules 13 and 14 remove the present restrictions on counterclaims. There are persuasive reasons why a defendant should
be allowed to balance his accounts with the plaintiff through
any claims he may have against him, even although there be
no factual connection between them.
Rule 18 removes the present restraints on the joinder of
actions, which are in some respects even more arbitrary than
the Common Law rules. It is a fair corollary to the counterclaim rule. The rule as to joinder of alternative parties is of
particular value, for under it a plaintiff may effectively determine liability, for example, in this type of case: a railroad contends it delivered freight, the consignee denies receiving the
goods. One or the other is liable, not both, and the rules of
procedure ought to allow the controversy to be settled in the
presence of all three. That is impossible under the present
Indiana practice.
Rule 46 abolishing the exception is clearly desirable. It
was always a formality, based upon the presumption that one
who did not dissent from a court's ruling consented to it.
Lawyers and litigants being what they are that is a violent
presumption contrary to the 'fact, and presumptions which
were much less violent have been held to violate the due
process clause.
Rule 51 requiring a specific objection to an instruction at
the time it is given, out of the presence of the jury, has been
condemned as very undesirable in this state. That strikes
me as curious, because in no other instance in the law is a
party permitted to sit back and make no objection to erroneous

NEW FEDERAL RULES

action by a court and then later successfully complain. There
is an accepted rule in all other instances which requires a
party to make a timely, specific and valid objection to erroneous action before he is legally harmed by it. Few rules
would have a more salutary effect than Rule 51. Attorneys
would of necessity have to be better prepared, but a case could
not be reversed for an erroneous instruction which no one
at the time thought was erroneous, or when if he did think so
he said nothing about it. It is not a valid argument to insist
that an attorney cannot be prepared to make such objections.
He can, for attorneys in other jurisdictions have operated
under such a rule for many years without difficulty. Likewise
it is not a persuasive argument to urge that a case always
ought to be decided on correct instructions. It is a fair inference that an error which escapes the judge and counsel will
certainly fail to impress the jury. In any event in all other
instances a client is bound by the oversight of his attorney,
just as he is bound by the conduct of any other agent. If the
attorney, for example, permits improper evidence without
objection he cannot later claim error and such evidence is
more likely to affect the result than an unobserved error in
the instructions.
Rules 52(b) and 59(a) allowing amendments of special
findings of fact are particularly desirable. The Indiana rule
on this subject which makes no provision for the amendment
of special findings, and indeed creates a presumption against
the person having the burden of proof as to a fact not found
or improperly found in the form of a legal conclusion, is at
best a vicious rule. Among other things it must often well
result in the decision of a case contrary to the clear merits
of the case. The rule creating a presumption against the
party having the burden of proof is in direct violation of the
statutes requiring the courts to decide each case on the merits
as they were developed under the evidence. Special findings
are a very valuable procedure and are little used in Indiana
bcause of this unwarranted presumption.
Rules 73-75 on appeals can be accurately described as at
least infinitely better than the present Indiana rules. An adop-
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tion of the Federal Rules on this subject would clarify and
simplify the Indiana practice in the following particulars: (1)
The present distinction between vacation and term time appeals would be abolished. Notice of appeal would be served in
every case, but the appellant would satisfy his obligation on
this score by the filing of a notice with the clerk. The burden
would then be cast upon the clerk to notify the other parties.
(2) It would be unnecessary to secure an extension of time for
the filing of a bond and bills of exceptions. These might be
filed and approved during vacation or after term without previous order. (3) The record would eliminate all duplications
and immaterial matters and would be subject to correction at
any time. It is clear that under these rules all of the present
strictness and danger in the field of appellate procedure in this
state would be removed.
V
In conclusion: It is undoubtedly true that in this country
the Puritan right of revolt still exists. Reform which is unacceptable to a decent majority of those involved is bound to
fail, no matter how sound it is. If a majority of lawyers and
judges in this state would treat an adoption of the Federal
Rules as state rules in the same manner they treated the Code
we are as well off under our present system. At the midwinter and summer meetings of the State Bar Association this
year motions recommending to the Supreme Court the adoption of the Federal Rules were passed without a dissenting
vote. Curiously enough that is, to my knowledge, the only
expression of opinion on the subject by the lawyers of the
state.
I would suggest that a passive interest in a serious and
meritorious suggested improvement of the administration of
justice in this state does not meet the standards of professional
conduct which describe the lawyer as an officer of the court.
The public interest in an efficient and effective system of pro.
cedure designed to correct defects and injurious practices
which experience demonstrates to exist is paramount to any
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personal advantage or disadvantage inherent in the old or a
new system.
A scientific and professional approach to this problem calls
for an active consideration of the problem by the Bar, individually and collectively, and then further-the exertion of
some pressure to bring about desirable remedies for observed
deficiencies.

